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[This article will discuss the topical issue of whether the Commonwealth, 
in Australia’s federal system of government, can rely on its so-called 
“corporations power” in order to pass planned industrial relations laws.  
The Federal Government has recently indicated its plans to introduce a 
national system of industrial relations regulation in Australia.  While the 
detail of the proposed legislation is not currently to hand, the planned 
changes raise a controversial issue whether the Australian Government 
would permit such regulation. This article considers the corporations 
power as justification for the proposed laws.] 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
This article considers the chances of success of the proposed challenge by the States 
to the attempt by the Commonwealth to (largely) nationalize the industrial relations 
system through the use of the corporations power.  Though a challenge might be 
politically understandable, it concludes there is little support for such a challenge in 
the current jurisprudence on the interpretation of the section.  The States would 
need to re-open the debate on principles established by majority in several High 
Court decisions on the corporations power.  The proposition that the Common-
wealth might use its corporations power to regulate industrial conditions is far from 
novel. 
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As well as the precedents, the article will consider policy arguments in favour of a 
broad or narrow approach to the section.  It is concluded there are sound policy 
reasons for interpreting the corporations power in a broad way, given the Com-
monwealth’s need to manage the economy.  A broad view of the corporations 
power to regulate industrial relations would also be supported by the American 
constitutional experience, albeit in a different context.  Policy arguments are sub-
mitted to be particularly relevant to interpretation of the Constitution. 
 
II BACKGROUND 
The Commonwealth has indicated it plans some important changes to the process 
by which minimum working conditions are established, changes to guaranteed 
minimum rights, and to encourage individual negotiation of contracts at the enter-
prise level.  These changes would greatly affect the role of the Industrial Relations 
Commission in establishing and reviewing minimum wages, and the principle of 
collective bargaining.  The States have indicated their intention to mount a High 
Court challenge to the validity of the legislation.  This is not surprising, given the 
strong opposition to the changes from the union movement.  Rights such as collec-
tive bargaining and an award safety net are articles of faith in the union movement.  
The Australian Labor Party currently holds office in every State and Territory in 
Australia.1
 
In essence, the Government’s policy is that the proposed legislation2 will protect 
five basic conditions: 
• Minimum and award classification wages (established by the pro- 
posed Australian Fair Pay Commission); 
• Annual leave; 
• Personal/carer’s leave; 
• Parental leave; and 
• Maximum ordinary hours of work. 
 
Other entitlements will be a matter for negotiation, preferably by way of individual 
negotiation between employer and employee, but also by way of collective bargain-
ing if agreed.  Unions may or may not take part in the negotiation process. 
 
The idea is to move away from the current system of awards being made at both 
Federal and State level.  The Federal Government claims this process is extremely 
complex, especially for employers carrying on business across state lines who may 
1 The new New South Wales Premier, Morris Iemma, announced as soon as he took office on 2 August 
that it was his intention to challenge the legislation in the High Court of Australia.  Tasmanian Premier 
Paul Lennon announced new legislation on 6 August to guarantee workers’ conditions, including annual 
leave, paid breaks, sick leave, redundancy, and the 38-hour week.  Other States are expected to follow 
suit.  States’ legislation of this nature could expect to be challenged under s109 once the federal laws are 
enacted. 
2 This is based on statements the Government has made about the proposed law.  At the time of writing, 
the bill is not available. 
2005 Precedent and Policy  442     
 
                                                          
be dealing with a number of different awards and tribunals for a relatively few 
number of employees, and even intrastate employers who might have employees on 
different awards, and a combination of Federal and State awards.3  There are cur-
rently 2300 federal awards and 1700 State awards in Australia.  The Federal Gov-
ernment proposes to virtually abolish this two-tiered system of award determination 
– there will be few State awards and tribunals dealing with industrial relations 
matters.  Awards will also be simplified, and unfair dismissal laws will be limited 
only to employers of more than 100 staff.  Firms will also be able to offer a longer 
probationary period of employment.4
 
Perhaps surprisingly, the High Court has never had to decide whether or not the 
Commonwealth can use its corporations power (s 51(20)) to comprehensively 
regulate the working conditions of those who are engaged in employment with a 
corporation.  While it is clear that the Commonwealth can rely on other heads of 
power to legislate in this area5 particularly the external affairs power and the trade 
and commerce power,6 the use of the corporations power is less certain.7  The issue 
arose to some extent in Victoria v Commonwealth (Industrial Relations Act Case);8 
however in that case the plaintiff conceded without challenge that s 51(20) could be 
used to regulate working conditions of employees of a corporation: 
 
If, as is conceded, the Parliament can legislate pursuant to s51(20) … as to 
the industrial rights and obligations of employees and employer corpora-
tions of the kind specified in s51(20) … it can also legislate … as to the 
conditions to attach to those rights and obligations.9   
 
3 “The current system of overlapping federal and State awards is too complex, costly and inefficient.  
Employers and employees frequently face a patchwork of regulation … (national laws on industrial 
relations are) a next logical step towards a workplace relations system that supports greater freedom, 
flexibility and individual choice”:  Prime Minister John Howard, Address to the Menzies Research 
Centre 11/4/2005, <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech1320.html> (last visited 25 August 
2005). 
4 During periods of probation, unfair dismissal laws do not apply. 
5 The Court has confirmed that existing s 51(35) will not be relevant in interpreting regulation of indus-
trial relations using other heads of power:  Pidoto v Victoria, (1943) 68 CLR 87 (High Court of Austra-
lia, 1943) and Re Pacific Coal Pty Ltd; Ex Parte Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, 
(2000) 172 ALR 257 (High Court of Australia, 2000). 
6 For a full discussion, refer David McCann, First Head Revisited: A Single Industrial Relations System 
Under the Trade and Commerce Power 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 75 (2004). 
7 For a discussion of all possible heads of power that might support an industrial relations law, see 
William Ford, The Constitution and the Reform of Australian Industrial Relations, 7 AUSTRALIAN 
JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 105 (1994) and William Ford, Reconstructing Australian Labour Law: A 
Constitutional Perspective, 10 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR LAW 1 (1997). 
8 (1996) 187 CLR 416. 
9 (1996) 187 CLR 416, 539 per Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh and Gummow JJ.  Andrew 
Stewart in Federal Labour Law and New Uses for the Corporations Power, 14 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL 
OF LABOUR LAW 145 (2001) considers the use of s 51(20) in the industrial relations context in light of 
the Industrial Relations Act Case, and see George Williams and Amelia Simpson, The Expanding 
Frontiers of Commonwealth Intervention in Industrial Relations,10 AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF LABOUR 
LAW 222 (1997). 
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In this case, the Commonwealth was conceded to be able to legislate on collective 
bargaining by relying on the corporations power.10  The corporations power cer-
tainly supports a law concerning the review of an unfair contract with an independ-
ent contractor, at least where a ‘constitutional corporation’ is a party.11  It is new 
territory, however, whether the corporations power allows the Commonwealth to 
set five guaranteed working conditions, and to take away most of the powers of 
State tribunals, by vastly reducing the number of State awards. 
 
It is true that the Commonwealth is given limited direct ability under the Constitu-
tion to regulate industrial relations, under the s 51(35) power.12  However, the 
power would be unlikely to support any of the changes the Federal Government is 
proposing to make. Section 51(35) presumes that an industrial relations issue must 
be created by a dispute, and then requires the involvement of a third party in mak-
ing a decision to resolve the dispute.13  The crux of the new changes, further en-
couraging individual workplace agreements between employer and employee, is 
directly at odds with this way of dealing with workplace issues.  The ‘dispute’ is in 
almost all cases created by the serving of a log of claims by a union.  The Federal 
Government’s changes are designed to give employees a choice about union mem-
bership, rather than presume that there will be a relevant union that will “bring on” 
the dispute.14  Decisions about working conditions must be made by a third party, 
rather than the parties themselves.  Further, the decision made by the third party 
binds only those who are parties to the dispute.15  In other words, s 51(35) is likely 
to be completely useless to the Commonwealth in implementing its desired 
changes. 
 
This article will be confined to an analysis of whether the mooted changes are likely 
to be found constitutional or not by the High Court under s 51(20).  Other possible 
heads of power will not be considered.  Further, the author does not pass judgment 
on the desirability or otherwise of the proposed laws.  This is, of course, a political 
matter, and a matter that is not relevant to the question of their constitutionality. 
 
It will be necessary to discuss how the corporations power has come to be inter-
preted, in order to assess its ability to support workplace relations laws.  This dis-
10 Further, to legislate on minimum conditions of employment, unfair dismissal, discrimination, the right 
to strike and leave entitlements by implementing an international convention, relying on the external 
affairs power. 
11 Re Dingjan and Others; Ex Parte Wagner, (1995) 183 CLR 323 (High Court of Australia, 1995). 
12 The head of power relates only to conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of an 
industrial dispute extending beyond the boundaries of any one State. 
13 The court has said that ‘conciliation and arbitration’ requires the involvement of a third party.  The 
author does not see how this can be related to an individual workplace agreement negotiated between 
employer and employee. 
14 The presumption that the only way that workplace arrangements can be made is by creating a ‘dispute’ 
may also be seen as unnecessarily confrontational.  In many cases, employers and employees may be 
able to reach a mutually satisfactory arrangement. 
15 That head of power does not, according to the authorities, allow for a common rule to be made to all in 
a particular industry:  R v Kelly; ex parte Victoria, (1950) 81 CLR 64 (High Court of Australia, 1950), 
Australian Boot Trade Employees’ Federation v Whybrow and Co, (1910) 11 CLR 311 (High Court of 
Australia, 1910). 
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cussion will be confined to comments in the various corporations head cases that 
relate particularly to the industrial relations issue.  Part A of the article considers 
what arguments the States might use in challenging the validity of the Common-
wealth’s proposed laws.  Part B of the article considers the Commonwealth’s argu-
ments to support the law, quite apart from arguments based on the case law.  Again, 
these arguments are presented on the assumption that particularly in relation to 
constitutional interpretation, the High Court should take into account factors other 
than simply precedent. 
 
III POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS AGAINST COMMONWEALTH 
REGULATION OF IR UNDER S 51(20) 
A Internal/External Distinction 
The very first case dealing with the corporations power contains interesting dicta 
comments about the ability of the Commonwealth to regulate the industrial condi-
tions of a corporation’s employees.  Though the decision itself is largely16 discred-
ited due to the influence on it of the reserved powers heresy,17 some members of the 
court considered whether the power might be available to regulate industrial rela-
tions.  Those who did reached different conclusions.  On the one hand, Griffith CJ 
commented that:  
 
The Commonwealth Parliament can make any laws it thinks fit with regard 
to the operation of the corporation, for example may prescribe what offi-
cers and servants it shall employ, what shall be the hours and conditions of 
labour, what remuneration shall be paid to them.18
 
On the other hand, Isaacs J found that: 
 
Viewing a corporation as a completely equipped body ready to exercise its 
faculties and capacities, it must be that outward exercise which naturally 
and inevitably remains as the subject of federal control.  This disposes of 
the contention that, if these sections be valid, the Commonwealth Parlia-
ment would be entirely at large, and that a schedule of wages and hours 
could be prescribed for these corporations, so also as to the qualifications 
16 Although its finding that s 51(20) could not be used to legislate over the incorporation process has 
been upheld: New South Wales v Commonwealth (Incorporation Case), (1990) 169 CLR 482 (High 
Court of Australia, 1990). 
17 As an example, Griffith CJ commented that s 51(20) “empowers the Commonwealth to prohibit a 
trading or financial corporation formed within the Commonwealth from entering into any field of 
operation, but does not empower the Commonwealth to control the operations of a corporation which 
lawfully enters upon a field of operation, the control of which is exclusively reserved to the States” 
(354).  The doctrine of reserved powers was officially killed off in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v 
Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd, (1920) 28 CLR 129 (High Court of Australia, 1920), although some claim 
its ghost still walks.   
18 Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead (1909) 8 CLR 330, 348 (High Court of Australia 1909).  
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of their directors; all that is purely internal management and equipment, 
and in no way directly affects the exercise of their capacities of trading or 
their financial operations or other public capacities, nor is it incidental to 
the control of their activities.19
 
Viewing the corporations power as he did, Isaacs J also maintained that the creation 
of corporations was a matter for the States.  He in effect linked the two ideas, that 
the Commonwealth could not regulate incorporation, nor internal management of 
the company, for the same reason – that the power presupposed the existence of 
corporations, including the setup of their internal structures, including staffing. It 
operated thus on something the corporation, already established and staffed, did 
with an external body, particularly members of the public.20
 
Though the Convention Debates do not strongly assist in this viewpoint, there is 
some support for this position in the writings of Moore.  He said, writing in 1910, 
that: 
 
The recognition, the field of operations, and the management, the winding 
up and dissolution – all the inherent qualities which distinguish the juristic 
from the natural person, would thus be submitted to federal law.  But there 
the Commonwealth would leave it; and the actual carrying on of business 
by the corporation, and the legal relations with outsiders to which it gives 
rise – its property, its contracts, and its liabilities would be under the sole 
control of the State laws.21
 
It is considered perhaps the States’ strongest argument in challenging the validity of 
the Commonwealth’s proposal, in terms of reasoning.  The difficulty with it is that 
it is effectively too late to return to this argument – it has not been made again since 
1909, and has effectively been overruled in cases such as Strickland v Rocla Con-
crete Pipes Ltd.22  Nor it is supported by the plain text of the Constitution, to which 
a majority of the Court has made it clear they will look in assessing constitutional-
ity. 
19 Huddart, Parker and Co Pty Ltd v Moorehead, (1909) 8 CLR 330, 396.  The other justices did not 
consider the issue, though Higgins J commented that ‘It is for the State Parliament to regulate what 
contracts or combinations a corporation may make in the course of the permitted business’ (at 414).  This 
comment might also have included employment contracts. 
20 However, this is not supported by a consideration of the history of the provision.  It was based on s 
15(i) of the Federal Council of Australasia Act 1885 (Imp), which was incorporated in cl 52 of the 
Constitution presented to the 1891 Convention.  These provisions referred to a power to legislate in 
respect of the status ... of foreign corporations and corporations formed in any State or part of the 
Commonwealth.  It was at the 1891 Convention that the word ‘trading’ was added to the general power 
over corporations.  See also S Corcoran, Corporate Law and the Australian Corporation: A History of s 
51(20) of the Australian Constitution, 15 JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 131 (1994). 
21 SIR W HARRISON MOORE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA 471 (1910).  
However, it is unclear to what extent this view was influenced by the High Court’s decision the year 
before in Huddart Parker, affected as it was by the now-discredited reserved powers doctrine.  Immedi-
ately after the quote above, Harrison Moore adds “this is partly decided, partly supported by the majority 
of the High Court in Huddart Parker”. 
22 (1971) 124 CLR 529. 
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B   The Head is Confined to Trading Activities 
A related but distinct argument is that s 51(20) should be read narrowly according 
to a trade/non-trade divide.  Some judges, perhaps mindful of the ‘federal bal-
ance’,23 have advocated that only laws relating to trading activities of trading corpo-
rations will be within the s 51(20) head of power.  Or, as Gibbs CJ said, ‘in other 
words … the nature of the corporation to which the laws relate must be significant 
as an element in the nature or character of the laws’.24  Dawson J saw the legislation 
in Tasmanian Dams as unsupported by s 51(20) because there was nothing in the 
way the Act related to corporations in the fact they were trading corporations – he 
concluded they were merely ‘pegs upon which Parliament has sought to hang 
legislation on an entirely different topic’, although the premise behind this comment 
may be questioned, with respect.25  Wilson J found the legislation unsupported by 
the corporations power, because the substance of the law did not sufficiently relate 
to the characteristics of trading corporations.26
 
On the other hand, others have flatly rejected the limit, with Mason J in Actors 
Equity countering that a constitutional grant of legislative power should not be read 
pedantically.  Nothing in the Constitution required that only trading activities could 
be regulated.27  He considered a middle position in Tasmania Dams, that the Com-
monwealth could regulate and prohibit acts and activities engaged in by a trading 
corporation for the purposes of engaging in its trading activities.28  Deane J in the 
 
23 For example, Gibbs CJ in Actors’ and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd, 
(1982) 150 CLR 169 (Actors’ Equity) justified his narrow view of the scope of s 51(20) as not including 
a complete code of laws regarding corporations, “having regard to the federal nature of the Constitution” 
(at 181). 
24 Or “the fact that the corporation is a foreign (or trading) corporation should be significant in the way in 
which the law relates to it”: Actors’ and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd, (1982) 
150 CLR 169, 182-183. He adhered to this view in Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), 
(1983) 158 CLR 1, 118, Wilson and Dawson JJ reached a similar conclusion (202, 316-317). 
25 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, 316-317. To the extent that 
this comment suggests that laws can have only one characterization, the comment is with respect submit-
ted not to be correct.  For example, Stephen J in Actors Equity noted “valid laws of the Commonwealth 
may possess several characters and the fact that one or more of such characters is not within a head of 
Commonwealth power will not spell validity … the task is not to single out one predominant character of 
a law which, because it can be said to prevail over all others, leads to the attaching to the law of one 
description only as truly apt” (at 194).  Refer also to Strickland v Rocla Concrete Pipes, (1971) 124 CLR 
468 and Re F; Ex Parte F, (1986) 161 CLR 376, 387 confirming that a law “can possess more than one 
character in the sense that it can properly be characterized as a law with respect to more than one subject 
matter” (Mason and Deane JJ).  Dawson J expressed a similar view in Re Dingjan; Ex Parte Wagner 
(1995) 183 CLR 323, 346. 
26 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, 202. 
27 Actors’ and Announcers Equity Association v Fontana Films Pty Ltd, (1982) 150 CLR 169, 207; to 
like effect Murphy J (at 212).  Brennan J in the case agreed that a law regulating both trading and non-
trading activities would be supported by s 51(20) (at 222).  The judges adhered to this view in Com-
monwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1; Mason J (at 148-149), Murphy J (at 
179).  Mason CJ expressed similar views in later cases, including Re Dingjan; Ex Parte Wagner, (1995) 
183 CLR 323 334. 
28 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, 148. Brennan J agreed that 
activities conducted by a corporation for the purposes of its trading functions could be regulated under s 
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same case dismissed as unrealistic an attempt to draw a line between trading and 
non-trading activities, on the basis that the Commonwealth could regulate the 
former but not the latter.  The categories were in his view clearly linked.29
 
States who seek to challenge the Commonwealth’s ability to legislate on industrial 
relations under its s 51(20) power may seek to adopt the narrow view that the Com-
monwealth can only legislate regarding trading activities.  If this is accepted, it 
follows as a reasonable proposition that the Commonwealth cannot regulate em-
ployment conditions of employees.  This would be on the basis that the employment 
process is not in itself a trading activity (unless the corporation is a job placement 
agency), but rather a means to an end of trading activity.  
 
However, such a change in the Court’s approach, while possible, is submitted to be 
unlikely.  It has been accepted since the Tasmanian Dams case that the Common-
wealth’s corporations power extends, at least to some extent, further than merely 
regulating trading activities.  There is (or has been) majority support for the position 
that the Commonwealth can regulate activities done by a corporation for the pur-
poses of its trading activities.30  The alleged distinction between trading activities 
and non-trading activities has, rightly in the author’s view, been subjected to strong 
criticism31 that it is an artificial distinction.  It can be a very difficult line to draw.  
Clearly, the corporation employs staff ‘for the purposes of its trading activities’.  
The raison d’etre of the corporation is to trade, and it is obvious that a corporation 
cannot do anything on its own – it requires people through which to conduct activi-
ties.   
 
It seems relatively uncontroversial that the Commonwealth can regulate the em-
ployment of employees under s 51(20), since this activity (namely the employment 
process including on what conditions the employee is hired) is an action done for 
the purposes of trade,32 at least where it is carried out by an organization that is a 
trading corporation.  There should be no constitutional objection then to the Com-
monwealth mandating some minimum terms and conditions, establishing a body to 
establish a level of fair pay, and to simplifying awards. 
 
C Limits Based on Discrimination/Sufficient Connection  
It is true that in the context of considering precisely the issue of the application of s 
51(20) to support an industrial relations law, the High Court in Re Dingjan; Ex 
 
51(20) ibid at 241, without deciding whether non-trading functions unconnected with trade could be 
regulated.  Presumably, Murphy and Deane JJ would agree that the Commonwealth could regulate 
activities done for the purpose of trade, so this is a majority position in the case. 
29 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, 270. 
30 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, per Mason, Murphy Brennan 
and Deane JJ. 
31 For example, Deane J in Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, 269-
270. 
32 Three of the judges from the Tasmanian Dams case would justify it further on the basis that the 
Commonwealth can in any event regulate the non-trading activities of corporations. 
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Parte Wagner33 imposed some boundaries on the use of the corporations power in 
this context.  Yet even though the law was struck down, it is submitted the States 
might find the case more of a hindrance than of assistance in seeking now to pre-
vent the Commonwealth from legislating in this area. 
 
The case involved a challenge to industrial relations laws purported to be based on 
the corporations power. Section 127A(2)(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 1988 
(Cth) gave the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) power to review 
a contract involving an independent contractor on the grounds it was unfair, harsh 
or against the public interest. The power was confined to contracts to which a 
constitutional corporation was a party, and in respect to a contract relating to the 
business of a constitutional corporation.  A majority of the court found the law not 
to be supported by s 51(20).   
 
Brennan J in the majority found the law had to discriminate against constitutional 
corporations and other persons.34  It had to have a differential effect on constitu-
tional corporations.  Here the law went further – it allowed the AIRC to vary con-
tracts, even where neither party to the contract was a constitutional corporation. 
Exercise of the power to vary the contract may not affect the business of the corpo-
ration at all.35  However, Brennan J noted in his judgment that: 
 
A law conferring power to vary or set aside a contract between a constitu-
tional corporation and an independent contractor for work to be done for 
the purposes of the corporation’s business where the contract is harsh or 
unfair … would be a law supported by s51(20).36
 
Another judge in the majority in the Dingjan case, McHugh J, indirectly confirmed 
the Commonwealth’s ability to legislate on working conditions of constitutional 
corporations: 
 
So, where a law seeks to regulate the conduct of persons other than s 
51(20) corporations or the employees, officers or shareholders of those 
corporations, the law will generally not be authorized by s51(20) unless it 
does more than operate by reference to the activities, functions, relation-
ships or business or such corporations.37
 
33 Re Dingjan, (1985) 183 CLR 323. 
34 Kirby J in Re Pacific Coal Pty Ltd; Ex Parte Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, (2000) 
172 ALR 257 (High Court of Australia, 2000) also applied a discrimination test to an interpretation of 
the corporations power. 
35 Toohey J’s formulation was similar – the law was invalid because it could apply to contracts that did 
not affect the business of the corporation or any of its activities: Re Dingjan, (1985) 183 CLR 323, 354; 
similarly McHugh J required a relationship between a contract and the business of a s 51(20) corpora-
tion: Re Dingjan, (1985) 183 CLR 323, 370. 
36 Re Dingjan, (1985) 183 CLR 323, 339. 
37 Re Dingjan, (1985) 183 CLR 323, 370.  Further, in the earlier case of Actors Equity, Murphy J in dicta 
stated the corporations power extended to laws dealing with industrial relations, and would support laws 
about the wages and conditions of employees, and other industrial matters. 
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Clearly, the three minority judges Mason CJ Deane and Gaudron JJ38 believed the 
Commonwealth could regulate at least some work relationships between employer 
and employee, since they validated the legislation under the corporations power.  
Thus, five of the seven High Court judges in this 1995 case have expressly con-
firmed the Commonwealth’s use of the corporations power to regulate at least some 
aspects of work relationships.39
 
So it is true that the case recognized the Commonwealth’s power to legislate on 
industrial relations via s 51(20) was circumscribed by the discrimination/sufficient 
connection test.  The problem for the States is that in doing so, the High Court 
implicitly or explicitly confirmed that the Commonwealth could regulate the work-
ing arrangements of constitutional corporations.  In other words, the Common-
wealth could pass a law allowing for a review of a work contract with a 
constitutional corporation, provided the law focused directly on constitutional 
corporations, and could not apply to contracts where that corporation was not an 
immediate party.  
 
D Provisional Conclusion  
It is concluded that the States do not have any strong grounds on which to challenge 
the constitutional basis for the Commonwealth regulating the industrial conditions 
of employees of corporations under s 51(20). 
 
IV ARGUMENTS THAT THE COMMONWEALTH REQUIRES BROAD 
POWER OVER CORPORATIONS – PRINCIPLE 
The arguments presented by those judges who have advocated a broad view of the 
corporations power tend to involve one or more of the following: 
 
• giving the words of the section their plain meaning as the Engi-
neers case requires, the power is not subject to any expressed lim-
its, in particular the ability to regulate trading corporations is not 
limited only to its trading activities, and in any event such a dis-
tinction would be difficult to establish and somewhat artificial 
since non-trading activities are usually carried out in anticipation 
of or to facilitate trading activities 
38 Gaudron J also stated this view in Re Pacific Coal, (2000) 172 ALR 257 (High Court of Australia, 
2000): “I have no doubt that (the corporations power) extends to laws prescribing the industrial rights 
and obligations of corporations and their employees and the means by which they are to conduct their 
industrial relations”. 
39 The remaining two judges, Dawson and Toohey JJ, did not expressly state whether or not the Com-
monwealth could use the power to regulate industrial relations matters.  They decided on the ground of 
lack of connection between the organisation’s corporate status and the law; it might have been thought 
that if they did have an objection to the Commonwealth’s ability to legislate in this way, they would 
have indicated so – they did not. 
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• words in the Constitution should not as a matter of principle be 
read in a narrow and pedantic way 
• apparently clear words in the Constitution should not be read 
down to preserve some individualized notion of the ‘federal bal-
ance’ and where that balance might most appropriately be struck, 
such a concept arguably harking back to the ‘bad old days’ of re-
served powers reasoning, as well as being inherently uncertain 
and subjective.40 
 
The author respectfully agrees with the above arguments, and would now like to 
add some further arguments justifying a strong federal government power to regu-
late the activities of corporations based on the nature of the corporate entity. 
 
A Nature of Corporate Activity 
One policy argument in favour of strong regulation of corporate activity (in other 
words a broad reading of the Commonwealth’s corporations power)41 concerns the 
nature of corporations.  This relates to the current matter for discussion, given that 
the broader the interpretation of the corporations power, the greater the likelihood 
that it will be considered to include regulation of employment rights and obligations 
of employees of corporations.   
 
It is true there has not been a great deal of discussion in the s 51(20) cases about 
this rationale for a broad view of the corporations power. One reference however 
occurs in the judgment of Mason J in the Tasmanian Dams case where His Honour 
explains: 
 
there is much to be said for the view that one of the objects of s51(20) was 
to enable Parliament to regulate transactions between the categories of 
corporation mentioned and the public, indeed to enable Parliament to pro-
tect the public, should the need arise, in relation to the operation of such 
corporations;42   
 
and perhaps Deane J was talking about the same thing when he said: 
 
No one with knowledge of the political and other non-trading activities of 
trading corporations in and since the days of the East India Company 
would suggest that the non-trading activities of trading activities are any 
40 It is also implied that a principle of dual characterization applies, that as long as a law is about (and 
sufficiently connected with) a head of power, it is not relevant to its characterization that it is also about 
another topic that is not within power. 
41 National regulation is linked with strong regulation given it is uniform.  A corporation could not thus 
avoid the regulation by narrowing its operations to a particular part of Australia. 
42 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, 148. 
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less appropriate to the placed under the legislative control of a national 
government than are their trading activities.43
 
Some view corporations as potentially quite evil, not constrained in their behaviour 
by any kind of morality and requiring strong control, which is equated with a broad 
national power to regulate corporations, with implications for the current question.44
 
It is asserted that only the national government can exercise the kind of strong 
control that is necessary over a corporation.  The history of corporate law in Austra-
lia has reflected an eventual recognition of the need for federal regulation of the 
topic, and a movement away from the original position where State law regulated 
companies. Corporations Law is now largely a federal responsibility, and the func-
tions of the former State Corporate Affairs Commissions have been transferred to a 
federal body.  It would be consistent with the overall trend in corporate regulation 
in Australia since federation to assert that the Commonwealth should also have 
power over industrial relations relating to corporations. 
 
B Control Over Corporations is an Essential Tool in Man-
aging the Economy 
Given the growing importance of corporations and that the corporate form is the 
main means by which business is carried out, one might argue that Commonwealth 
requires broad control over corporations as a tool in managing the economy, par-
ticularly in light of the lack of direct constitutional power the Commonwealth has 
over ‘the economy’. 
 
Some High Court judges over the years have referred to the need for the Common-
wealth to be able to manage the economy effectively, as a reason for giving a broad 
interpretation of Commonwealth powers, and (with the same effect) broad interpre-
tation of limits on State power.  Particularly in relation to the s 90 prohibition on the 
State levying customs and excise duties, some members of the Court have indicated 
that the section should be read broadly, in order to give the Commonwealth broad 
43 Commonwealth v Tasmania (Tasmanian Dam Case), (1983) 158 CLR 1, 269-270. 
44 For example, economist Adam Smith wrote in his WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) that because managers 
could not be trusted with others’ money, “negligence and profusion” would result from having busi-
nesses organized as corporations.  Justice Brandeis echoed the sentiment in 1933 when he claimed that 
corporations were “Frankenstein monsters” capable of doing evil (Louise K Liggett Co et al v Lee, 
Comptroller et al (1933) 288 US 517, 548, 567; refer also to JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE 
PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER 60 (2004).  Interestingly, in the preamble to the Norris-
La Guardia Act, part of the Roosevelt New Deal labour legislation, restrictions on employer’s property 
rights were justified on the ground that ‘under prevailing economic conditions, developed with the aid of 
governmental authority for owners of property to organize in the corporate … association, the individual 
worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract and to protect his freedom of labour, 
and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment’.  In other words, regulators 
believed it was justified to allow corporations to be regulated in terms of industrial relations in the 
interests of protecting the rights of workers. 
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control over the taxation of commodities so that the execution of whatever tax 
policy the Commonwealth chose could not be thwarted by State action.45   
 
First suggested by Dixon J in 1949, the suggestion was supported by Barwick CJ in 
Western Australia v Chamberlain Industries Pty Ltd.46  Mason J in the Hematite 
Petroleum47 and Philip Morris48 cases also referred to economic arguments favour-
ing Commonwealth control over taxation levels as a key component in its manage-
ment of the economy.  If the States could impose excise duties, Mason J claimed in 
the former case, the Commonwealth’s ability to protect and stimulate home produc-
tion and influence domestic price levels might be compromised, if a broad view of 
the prohibition were not taken.49   
 
These economic arguments in favour of broad Commonwealth power over a key 
economic plank were accepted by High Court majorities in the most recent s 90 
cases,50 including two justices who are currently on the High Court.  Of those dis-
senting judges who did not accept that view, none remain on the High Court.   
 
The point is this then in relation to the corporations power – the Commonwealth’s 
ability to regulate corporations must be read broadly because corporations dominate 
economic activity in Australia,51 and the Commonwealth is responsible for the 
economy.  If the Commonwealth could not regulate all that a corporation does (or at 
least anything the corporation does for the purposes of trade), it would lose the 
ability to regulate a key plank of economic activity in Australia.  It is submitted that 
most Australians have an expectation that it is the Commonwealth Government that 
primarily manages the economy in Australia. The High Court has by majority 
accepted this argument supports a broad reading of s 90 (having the effect that the 
Commonwealth is freer from State interference).  It should by analogy and for 
similar reasons support a broad reading of other economic powers, including 
s51(20), to prevent State Governments from interfering in the Commonwealth’s 
management of the economy.   
 
45 Parton v Milk Board (Victoria), (1949) 80 CLR 229 (High Court of Australia, 1949). 
46 (1970) 121 CLR 1, 17 stating that the wide view of the s90 prohibition was consistent with the control 
of the national economy as a unity which knows no State boundaries, by a legislature without direct 
legislative power over the economy. 
47 Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v Victoria, (1983) 151 CLR 599 (High Court of Australia, 1983) (Hema-
tite Petroleum). 
48 Philip Morris Ltd v Commissioner of Business Franchises, (1989) 167 CLR 399 (High Court of 
Australia, 1989). 
49 Hematite Petroleum Pty Ltd v Victoria, (1983) 151 CLR 599, 631; Deane J said that s 90 eliminated 
State boundaries as barriers in the path towards economic and national unity. 
50 Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v ACT, (No2), (1993) 178 CLR 561 (Mason CJ Brennan Deane and 
McHugh JJ)(High Court of Australia, 1993); Ha v New South Wales, (1997) 189 CLR 465 (Brennan CJ 
McHugh Gummow and Kirby JJ)(High Court of Australia, 1997). 
51 The Federal Government estimated that corporations employed 85% of non-farm labour in Australia 
(BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK: TOWARDS A SIMPLER NATIONAL WORKPLACE RELATION SYSTEM – 
DISCUSSION PAPER 1: THE CASE FOR CHANGE (Canberra, October 2000, by then Minister for Employ-
ment, Workplace Relations and Small Business Peter Reith). 
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This argument is submitted to support a broad reading of s 51(20) generally, but in 
the particular context of industrial relations, the argument may be stronger – it is 
essential in order for the Commonwealth to properly regulate the economy that it be 
able to regulate the industrial conditions of workers, at least those who work for the 
large majority of employers who are incorporated.  If the argument is accepted that 
the Commonwealth needs broad control of taxation of commodities to influence 
price levels of goods, inflation etc in the economy, surely the same argument goes 
for working conditions and pay scales.  The price of goods is clearly affected by the 
costs of producing them, and primary among these costs is labour cost.52  By regu-
lating labour costs, it indirectly affects the price of goods, hence demand and infla-
tion. The High Court has recognized these economic issues are the legitimate 
concern of the Commonwealth, and some members have taken them into account in 
interpreting the Constitution.  The author submits this process should continue, and 
be applied to the corporations context. 
 
More fundamentally, real wages and relative wage levels affect the competitiveness 
of Australian business.  Though the author concedes that the economy is affected by 
a multitude of factors such that the influence of one single factor is a matter of 
conjecture, many economists point to the link between labour market regulation and 
the economic health of a nation.53  Some have argued that decisions on a minimum 
wage level in Australia, in the past an important role of the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission, have significant impact on the economy.54 According to one 
estimate, Australia’s current minimum wage translates to 100 000 extra unem-
52 Interestingly, Australia’s minimum wage of $484 is higher than that of Great Britain ($455), Japan 
($334), France ($452), Germany ($452), New Zealand ($341), Ireland ($491), Canada ($206) and the 
United States ($5.15 per hour).  A 2005 Report by the United Kingdom Low Pay Commission found that 
of 13 OECD countries for 2004, Australia had the highest adult minimum wage relative to full time 
earnings:  NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE: LOW PAY COMMISSION REPORT (2005).  Without judging what 
is an appropriate level of minimum wage, these differences clearly impact on Australian businesses, and 
affect the ability of Australian organizations to compete in a globalised economy.  It, together with other 
matters such as leave entitlements and weekly working hours, are surely the legitimate concern of the 
Commonwealth.  Why should Australians have different leave entitlements, breaks and weekly working 
hours depending on which State they happen to live in? 
53 As a recent example, Hans-Werner Sim Director of the Ifo Institute for Economic Research in Munich, 
writing in the AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW newspaper, wrote of the German economy in Ill-
Prepared Germany is Still in a State of Shock (9 August 2005, 55) that “In order for the country (Ger-
many) to meet the challenges and to continue to grow, it would have to make its labour markets flexible.  
Only if wages adjust downward to accommodate the new international environment can German workers 
become competitive again”.  (Australia’s minimum wage is higher than that of Germany). More broadly, 
further growth in productivity in Australia has been tied to microeconomic reform, including labour 
market regulation:  GLENN OTTO, PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, 
Research Paper No 19 1997, Department of the Parliamentary Library, Information and Research 
Services. 
54 Andrew Leigh Employment Effects of Minimum Wages: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 36 
AUSTRALIAN ECON REV 361 (2003), Dolado et al, The Economic Impact of Minimum Wages in Europe, 
23 ECONOMIC POL 319 (1996).  An argument that Australia’s minimum wage must be reduced appears 
in, for example, Des Moore, Why Labour Market Players Should Have Freedom to Contract, 38 
AUSTRALIAN ECON REV 192 (June)(2005), pointing to the “employment-deterring effects from the 20 
commandments they have imposed” (referring to the current 20 allowable matters in awards and criticiz-
ing some members of the judiciary as “social justice gurus”), also Des Moore, The Effects of the Social 
Welfare System on Unemployment, 23 BULLETIN OF LABOUR  275 (1997). 
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ployed Australians, compared with the equivalent minimum wages in the United 
States and United Kingdom.55  Mark Wooden similarly concludes: 
 
The actions of AIRC, however, in persistently raising the federal minimum 
wage over time indicate that either it does not care about the jobless or that 
it believes there is no relation between the price of labour and the quantity 
demanded … the AIRC has little or no expertise that would enable it to 
make sound decisions which take account of the economic effects of 
minimum wage increases.56
 
The Organisation of Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) concluded 
in regards to the Australian economy that: 
 
Labour productivity has been affected through over-manning, poor work 
organization, unnecessary loss of machine time, high maintenance costs, 
time lost over demarcation disputes and/or heavy time loss by management 
in industrial relations matters.  Capital productivity may also have been re-
duced by constraints on the number of hours plants can be economically 
operated as a result of restrictive award conditions.57
 
It has also concluded that the responsiveness of money wages to changes in produc-
tivity were higher in countries with decentralized wage systems. Productivity-based 
wage growth is generally seen as a positive and sustainable attribute in a nation’s 
economy.    
 
Referring to the Australian economy in the 1990s, Sloan argues that:  
 
Only radical change which involves dismantling of key features of the in-
dustrial relations system, in particular reconfiguring the award structure, 
will produce labour market arrangements which are compatible with an in-
ternationalized economy.58
 
55 Matthew Ryan, Workplace Relations Reform, Prosperity and Fairness, 38 AUSTRALIAN ECON REV 
201, 209 (2005), applying work carried out for the United States Federal Reserve by  Donald Tulip DO 
MINIMUM WAGES RAISE THE NAIRU?, 38 FINANCE AND ECON DISCUSSION SERIES, Federal Reserve 
Board, Washington DC (2000). 
56 Workplace Relations Reform: Where to Now?, 38 AUSTRALIAN ECON REV 176, 178-179 (2005); cf 
Chris Briggs and John Buchanan, Work, Commerce and the Law: A New Australian Model?, 38 
AUSTRALIAN ECON REV 182 (2005). 
57 OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS: AUSTRALIA 1999-2000. 
58 Judith Sloan, Until the End of Time: Labour Market Reform in Australia, AUSTRALIAN ECON REV 65, 
66 (1992). Jeff Borland and Graeme Woodbridge Wage Regulation: Low-Wage Workers and Employ-
ment, in RESHAPING THE LABOUR MARKET: REGULATION, EFFICIENCY AND EQUALITY IN AUSTRALIA 
(Sue Richardson ed., 1999) conclude that the overall effect of deregulation of wage rates in Australia 
would be to increase employment of low-wage workers in Australia by 10-15% (at 119).  Bob Gregory, 
Eva Klug and Yew May Martin, in Labour Market Deregulation, Relative Wages and the Social Security 
System in Sue Richardson, id., similarly conclude deregulation of wage-setting for low-paid workers 
would result in increased employment of between 60 000 and 90 000 people (at 221). 
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While certainly Australia has enjoyed several years of ‘economic sunshine’ includ-
ing low inflation, many give credit for this to the reforms to the economy, including 
the introduction of decentralized wage fixing, carried out in the early to mid 1980s.  
As new challenges arise, for example the incredible rates of growth of Asian 
economies in recent years, from countries with very low wage levels, continuing 
reforms are necessary.  It is submitted that Australia’s very good performance in 
recent years has been despite, and certainly not because of, current labour regula-
tion arrangements in Australia.59   
 
While it is very difficult to quantify the actual impact on the economy, some studies 
have attempted to do so.  For example, Don Harding’s study for the Melbourne 
Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research involved surveying more than 
1800 enterprises of all sizes in Australia.  The particular brief in that study was to 
determine the impact of unfair dismissal laws on all types of business in Australia.  
Harding found that current unfair dismissal laws cost Australian business $1.3 
billion, or about 0.2% of GDP.  This was considered to be a conservative estimate.60  
The laws were said to adversely affect most the employment prospects of the un-
employed and low-skilled.  Without judging whether this is a price worth paying, 
the research clearly shows how laws directly affect the economy. 
 
Another means of quantifying the effect of labour market regulation on the econ-
omy is to consider how the introduction of individual and collective workplace 
bargaining in recent years in Australia has impacted productivity.  Matthew Ryan, 
economist with respected researchers Access Economics, estimated that in the 
absence of such workplace bargaining and with all other things being equal, Austra-
lia’s productivity growth would have been almost 1% lower each year through 
1994-2002.61
  
What is clear is that a decision on the deregulation or regulation of the labour mar-
ket is an important tool of economic policy.62  These are essential economic issues 
 
59 “In an age when our productivity must match that of global competitors, forcing Australian firms to 
comply with six different workplace relations systems is an anachronism that we can no longer afford”, 
Prime Minister John Howard, Address to the Menzies Research Centre, 11 April 2005, 
 <http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech1320.html> (last visited 25 August 2005); see also 
William Ford, Politics, the Constitution and Australian Industrial Relations: Pursuing a Unified Na-
tional System, 38 AUSTRALIAN ECON. REV. 211 (2005). 
60 DON HARDING, THE EFFECT OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL LAWS ON SMALL AND MEDIUM SIZE BUSINESSES  
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne (2002).  
61 Workplace Relations Reform, Prosperity and Fairness, 38 AUSTRALIAN ECON. REV. 201 (June)(2005) 
62 A further example of the prevailing view appears in a recent article Industrial Relations Reform in THE 
WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN on  6-7 August 2005 by Brad Norington:  
Bob Hawke’s Labor government began the job, but it had to be left to a conservative gov-
ernment to impose enough reform in industrial relations to make Australia competitive in a 
globalised world.  Hawke and his Treasurer Paul Keating .. realized that the nation’s future 
prosperity depended on far-reaching economic modernization.  The alternatively was to … 
maintain a closed, insular, low-productivity nation that relied on its wealth of natural re-
sources to survive while ignoring significant economic developments abroad … The greatest 
test for Australian workplaces is how they compare with the rest of the world as the nation 
tries to compete on open market terms. (at 28).   
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for the Commonwealth.  It is not just desirable, it is a necessity that the Common-
wealth must be able to regulate them.  This is submitted to justify a broad view of 
the corporations power. 
C The American Constitutional Jurisprudence 
Before considering whether the American constitutional case law can provide any 
assistance to resolving this issue of Australian constitutional law, some caveats 
must be entered.  Firstly, the relevant American cases do not refer to a corporations 
power but a general commerce clause – the American Constitution contains no 
reference to specific power over corporations, nor any equivalent to regulating 
industrial conditions as the Australian Constitution does in s 51(35).  It should also 
be conceded that some past High Court justices have occasionally rallied against the 
introduction of interpretations of the United States commerce clause in assessing 
Australian constitutional heads.63   
 
However, the author does not believe these comments preclude a consideration of 
the related United States provisions.  The founding fathers in Australia were clearly 
influenced by the United States Constitution in drafting our Constitution.  It seems 
ridiculous (with respect) to refuse to even consider whether the American experi-
ence might be relevant in interpreting the local document, though the author con-
cedes that differences in drafting and context need to be borne in mind – no-one is 
suggesting that the Australian High Court unquestioningly follow American juris-
prudence, but to the extent that common issues arise, the experience of other na-
tions is surely worth at least considering. 
 
The United States clause allows the federal government to regulate interstate and 
overseas commerce, and has been subject to much judicial interpretation.  In the 
landmark 1937 case of National Labour Relations Board v Jones and Laughlin 
Steel Corporation,64 the United States Supreme Court upheld provisions of the 
National Labour Relations Act which penalized unfair labour practices affecting 
interstate commerce.  The Court found that even though manufacture was not 
strictly speaking ‘commerce’,65 and even where the practices affected intrastate 
commerce, the Federal Government could still regulate it: 
 
 
Prime Minister Howard himself in an address to the Sydney Institute in July tied workplace reform to 
productivity improvements in a global economy where specialization and flexibility was increasingly 
valued.  At one time these comments would have enjoyed bi-partisan support, with the Hawke-Keating 
years featuring real labour market reform, including the move to enterprise bargaining.  The current 
Labor Opposition Leader has not indicated whether he supports broad labour market reform, but has 
indicated he is not opposed to individual workplace bargains (Australian Workplace Agreements): Kim 
Beazley, The ALP and Economic Reform, in SUSTAINING PROSPERITY (Peter Dawkins and Michael 
Stutchbury ed, 2005). 
63 Airlines of New South Wales Pty Ltd v New South Wales, (No 2) (1965) 113 CLR 54, 115 (Kitto J).  
However, the author does not think that comments by one judge precludes a discussion of the possibili-
ties. 
64 (1937) 298 US 1. 
65 the same decision was reached by the Australian High Court in Grannall v Marrickville Margarine Pty 
Ltd, (1955) 93 CLR 55 (High Court of Australia, 1955). 
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Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately consid-
ered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce 
from burdens or obstructions, Congress (has the) power to exercise that 
control.66
 
So the reasoning is that although Congress may not have power over activities 
when separately considered, if the activities have such a close and substantial rela-
tion to something within power that their control is essential or appropriate to 
protect the thing within power from burdens of obstructions, Congress can regulate 
the activities.67  This has been applied in the United States to justify industrial 
relations laws relying on the commerce clause.  Supporting the relevance of this 
decision in Australia, the High Court has confirmed the Commonwealth may use its 
general commerce power to regulate industrial relations.68
 
The analogous argument to the Jones ratio here is this – although generally indus-
trial relations laws, except in the very limited context allowed for by s 51(35), is not 
per se within the Commonwealth’s power, workplace rights and responsibilities (of 
employees of corporations, at least) have such a close and substantial relation to 
something within power (ie corporations) that their control is essential or appropri-
ate to protect the thing within power from burdens or obstructions (ie to protect 
corporations from having to comply with a multitude of different State laws on the 
topic). 
 
Although this is as far as the author currently argues the point, it may even be used 
to justify why the Commonwealth should be able to regulate the working conditions 
of all employees, whether they work for corporations or not.  This might be justified 
on the basis of the incidental power, supported by the United States jurisprudence.  
Given that at least 85% of employers are corporations, it might be considered 
incidental to regulate also the working conditions of the small number of other 
employees.  It has also been found in the United States that under the commerce 
clause, Congress can regulate even commerce that is for a farmer’s own consump-
tion, and not interstate or overseas trade or commerce at all.  This regulation was 
justified on the basis that the production still affected the broader market for that 
commodity.69   
 
66 (1937) 298 US 1, 34-35. 
67 This is similar to the High Court of Australia in the trade and commerce area finding that the Com-
monwealth can regulate intrastate trade and commerce, if it is so closely connected with interstate or 
overseas trade and commerce that the Commonwealth must by necessity regulate all of it: see, for 
example: Swift Australian Co Pty Ltd v Boyd Parkinson, (1962) 108 CLR 189 (High Court of Australia, 
1962) and Redfern v Dunlop Rubber Australia Ltd, (1964) 110 CLR 194 (High Court of Australia, 1964) 
68 Re Maritime Union of Australia; ex parte CSL Pacific Shipping Inc, (2003) 214 CLR 397 (High Court 
of Australia, 2003):  “a ship journeying for reward is in commerce, those who co-operate in the journey-
ing of the ship are in commerce and the wages of those persons and the conditions of their employment 
relate to that commerce”; refer also to Australian Steamships Ltd v Malcolm, (1914) 19 CLR 298 (High 
Court of Australia, 1914). 
69 Wickard v Filburn, (1942) 317 US 111 (United States Supreme Court, 1942); although the High Court 
did not seem to appreciate this kind of argument by extension in Re Dingjan and Others; Ex Parte 
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Analogously, one might argue that the employment conditions offered by non-
corporate employers affect the employment market for corporate employers, so for 
this reason, the Commonwealth Government should be able to regulate all industrial 
conditions, whether the employer is a corporation or not.70  The effect of this ap-
proach would certainly be to reduce complexity for businesses attempting to com-
ply with their responsibilities.   A business would need to comply only with one set 
of rules. 
 
D Duplication 
The extent of duplication in the current system, which includes both federal and 
state award making, a Federal Industrial Relations Commission and one in each 
State and Territory, has been well documented and does not require much elabora-
tion here.  Suffice to say that one current High Court justice has described it as a 
‘Serbonian bog of technicalities’,71 and reviews conducted (importantly, from both 
sides of politics) have found it overly complex, involving substantial overlap, 
duality and cost.72  It has been pointed out the current complex system favours 
experienced repeat players, including large unions and employers, at the expense of 
individual employees and small business employers.  It is said to exclude the voice 
of the ‘small, poor and unsure participants’.73
 
Duplication, a problem in itself, may also lead to unequal treatment of disputants in 
different jurisdictions, and forum shopping, seen in other contexts as generally 
inefficient and undesirable.74  Territorial disputes are inevitable - it is not surprising 
that many of the s109 inconsistency cases have involved questions of industrial 
relations.75  As McCann puts it 
 
 
Wagner, (1995) 183 CLR 323 (High Court of Australia, 1995), where the Court found that it was 
essential in order to rely on s 51(20) that the contract being reviewed involve a constitutional corpora-
tion.  A less direct link was not permitted. 
70 However, the author notes the High Court’s judgment in Re Dingjan that the corporations power may 
be restricted only to the regulation of working conditions of employees of corporations, and does not (as 
yet) extend to the regulation of workplace agreements that may have nothing to do with constitutional 
corporations.  This view, if accepted in future, would preclude the adoption of the Wickard reasoning in 
Australia. 
71 Kirby J in Re Pacific Coal, (2000) 203 CLR 346, 422 (High Court of Australia, 2000).  In an article in 
the WEEKEND AUSTRALIAN on 6-7 August 2005, Geoff Elliott started with “This country’s regula-
tion of industrial relations remains arguably the most complex in the developed world, and is rare in its 
national and statewide awards and enforcement of laws by bodies such as the Australian Industrial 
Relations Commission” ( at 28). 
72 REVIEW INTO AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW AND SYSTEMS (COMMITTEE) AUSTRALIAN 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW AND SYSTEMS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON REVIEW (Canberra: 
AGPS, 1985) Vol 2, at 270 (Hancock Report); BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: TOWARDS A SIMPLER 
NATIONAL WORKPLACE RELATIONS SYSTEM – DISCUSSION PAPER 1: THE CASE FOR CHANGE (Canberra, 
October 2000)(Peter Reith, then Minister for Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business). 
73 McCann, supra note 6, at 82.  
74 For example, in the area of conflict of laws, John Pfeiffer Pty Ltd v Rogerson, (2000) 203 CLR 503 
(High Court of Australia, 2000). 
75 For example, Australian Boot Trade Employees Federation v Whybrow and Co, (1910) 10 CLR 266 
(High Court of Australia, 1910), Federated Seamen’s Union v Commonwealth Steamship Owners’ 
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Six poorly resourced and administratively burdened systems, each strug-
gling to maintain national coherency in policy and practice, may merely 
exhibit a drag effect on economic performance and the achievement of 
workers’ rights76
 
The existing system may be hard to justify on any grounds. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
This article has considered the chances of success of the proposed challenge by the 
States to the attempt by the Commonwealth to (largely) nationalize the industrial 
relations system through the use of the corporations power.  It concludes there is 
little support for such a challenge in the current jurisprudence on the interpretation 
of the section.  In particular, a majority of the High Court has accepted that, at least, 
the Commonwealth can regulate not only the trading activities of corporations, but 
activities carried out for the purpose of trading.  The hiring of employees, and 
resolution of the terms on which an employee is engaged, is clearly an activity 
carried out for the purpose of trading.   
 
Quite apart from the precedents as they stand, there are sound policy reasons for 
interpreting the corporations power in a broad way.  These concern the need for 
strong regulation of corporate activity given the nature of a corporation, the need 
for the Commonwealth to properly manage the economy, and the extent of com-
plexity of the current systems with a large amount of overlapping and inefficiency.  
A broad view of the corporations power to regulate industrial relations would also 
be supported by the American constitutional experience, albeit in a different con-
text. 
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